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WILLs-HoLOGRAPHic-EvmBNCE AS TO TEST.AMENTARY lN.rmrr-The deceased had in her possession, at the time of her death, an envelope entitled 'Will
of Ella McNair." The envelope contained three separate sheets of paper dated
some nineteen months prior to Ella's death, upon which was written, entirely in
the hand of the deceased, what purported to be a will. The document opened with
the statement "I, Ella McNair •.. do hereby make my last will." The exordium
was followed by fifteen specific bequests, and then the writing ended abruptly at
the middle of the back of the third sheet. At the top of the second sheet was written 'Will of Ella McNair," and 'Will. Ella McNair" was at the top of the third.
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Ella had, with a few exceptions, followed the form of a holographic will provided
by her attorney. She had omitted the clause revoking prior wills, the clause appointing an executor, and her signature. There was evidence that before and
during Ella's final visit to the hospital, the instrument in question was not regarded
by her as her will, and that she was planning to draw up a new one. The will
was admitted to the probate,1 and the contestants appealed. Held, affirmed, two
justices dissenting. "Taking into account the general appearance of the writing,
the language and phraseology employed therein, ••• we are constrained to hold
that there was, at least in the mind of Mrs. McNair, a document before her sufficiently complete to induce her to affix her name thereon [referring to the inscription Will. Ella McNair' at the top of the third page] in token of execution of
the same as her will."2 In re McNair's Estate, (S.D. 1949) 38 N.W. (2d) 449.
The majority dealt with the extrinsic evidence that Ella had not considered
the document as her will by quoting the following rule from the earlier South
Dakota case of In re Brandow's Estate: 3 "The only evidence that will warrant the
conclusion that a holographic will is a complete and executed document must
be found in and on the instrument itself."4 On the basis of this, and similar statements made by other courts,5 the majority refused to consider the extrinsic evidence, and looked to the document alone in making its decision. It seems that
the court was mistaken in its application of the rule of the Brandow case, for the
contestant should always be allowed to prove lack of testamentary intent.6 The
rule of the Brandow case was designed to solve a problem peculiar to holographic
wills. In such wills, since there is l~s chance that a spurious document will be
foisted on the court, the usual strict requirements of execution are lacking. Because of this informality, equivocal and incomplete documents often find their
way into court, while their typewritten counterparts would be rejected at first
glance. The question of testamentary intent becomes acute when the document
offered has not been signed at the end, for then, even the most credulous will
question whether the maker considered the instrument finished. 7 Many courts
have sought to avoid this difficulty by adopting rules similar to that of the Brandow case.8 In so doing they have placed on the proponent of a holographic will
the burden of presenting an instrument sufficiently clear on its face to show the
I

1

S.D. Code (1939) §56.0210: "every will, other than an olographic will ••• must be

subscribed at the end thereof••••"
2 Principal case at 456.
s 59 S.D. 364, 240 N.W. 323 (1932).

4Jd. at 365.
5 In re Morgan's Estate, 200 Cal. 400, 253 P. 702 (1927); Dinning v. Dinning, 102 Va.
467, 46 S.E. 473 (1904).
6 68 C.J., Wills, §225.
7Jn re Manchester, 174 Cal. 417, 163 P. 358 (1917).
s See annotation in 29 A.L.R. 894 (1924).
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maker's testamentary intent. The rule, however, was not meant to deprive the
contestants of their right to prove lack of such intent. By applying the rule so as
to exclude contestant's evidence, the court gave the proponents an advantage not
intended by the Brandow decision. 9
Alan P. Goldstein, S.Ed.
9 A similar argument was made by Sickels, J., dissenting at p. 457. -Mechem, ''The Rule
in Lemayne v. Stanley," 29 MrcH. L. Rav. 685 (1931) contains a comprehensive dis·
cussion of the general problem raised by the principal case.

